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Determining the authenticity of integrated circuits is paramount in preventing counterfeit and malicious hardware 
from being used in critical military, healthcare, aerospace, consumer, and industry applications. Existing 
techniques to distinguish between authentic and counterfeit integrated circuits often includes destructive testing 
requiring subject matter experts.  We present a non-destructive technique to detect counterfeit integrated circuits 
using X-ray microscopy and advanced imaging analysis with different pattern recognition approaches. Our 
proposed method is completely automated, and runs in real time. In our approach, images of an integrated circuit 
are obtained from an X-ray microscope. Local binary pattern features are then extracted from the X-ray image 
followed by dimensionality reduction through principal component analysis, and alternatively through a non-linear 
principal component methodology using a stacked autoencoder embedded in a deep neural network. From the 
reduced dimension features, we train two types of learning machines, a support vector machine with a non-linear 
kernel, and a deep neural network. We present experiments using authentic and counterfeit integrated circuits to 
demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves an accuracy of 100% in distinguishing between the counterfeit 
and authentic samples.  
OCIS codes: (340.7440) X-ray imaging; (100.4996) Pattern recognition, neural networks; (150.1135) Machine vision,   
algorithms. 
 
1.Introduction 
 
Counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) represent a serious threat to 
the functionality and reliability of electronic equipment in the 
military, industry, and in healthcare. The Committee of Armed 
Services of the United States Senate found that there were 1,800 
cases of counterfeit electronics entering the U.S. supply chain 
from 2009 to 2010 alone [1] and the Semiconductor Industry 
Associates estimate that counterfeiting costs U.S. semiconductor 
companies 7.5 billion dollars annually [2]. Globally, it has been 
estimated that illegitimate production of components costs 
electronic companies worldwide 100 billion dollars annually [3]. 
Currently there are two approaches to identify counterfeit 
hardware, physical analysis and electrical testing [4].  We will 
briefly discuss each approach and the advantages our method 
has over the existing techniques. 
Physical analysis of integrated circuits falls into two 
main categories, interior testing and exterior testing [5]. Interior 
testing often destroys the samples being analyzed, so in a 
scenario where there is a large batch of chips with a few 
counterfeits mixed in, this technique is not feasible. Exterior 
testing inspects ICs using metric based tests. The results of these 
tests depend largely on the subject matter expert [6], and 
therefore are prone to human error and lack automation. 
Electrical testing of integrated circuits has been presented as a 
means to overcome the deficits associated with physical analysis; 
however these methods also come with their own set of 
disadvantages [6]. Electrical parametric testing is problematic 
because the variance in electrical parameters between integrated 
circuits of the same type can be high, even if all of the samples 
are authentic, and changes in the electrical parameters can also 
be due to the age of the device rather than counterfeiting [7]. 
Functional and structural testing often require a specific chip 
infrastructure or extraneous information such as a circuit netlist 
or integrated circuit scan chain that is not always available. 
Finally Burn-in testing which measures circuits under stressful 
conditions suffers from the same sample destructive problems as 
certain physical tests mentioned above.  
X-ray imaging is a powerful technique to inspect the 
features and details of objects which are unable to be viewed 
using the visible spectrum of light [8-13]. Thus, X-ray imaging is 
a useful tool for the inspection of ICs by examining the details 
concealed by the packaging surface. We propose a real time 
automated IC authentication technique using X-ray microscopy 
integrated with image processing and classification algorithms to 
inspect the ICs. Images captured with an X-ray microscope are 
first registered using a series of correspondence points obtained 
through normalized cross correlation filtering and the affine 
transform. After registration, we apply local binary pattern 
(LBP) feature extraction to characterize the IC images. The 
dimensionality of the resulting features is reduced using linear 
principal component analysis (PCA), as well as non-linear PCA 
through a stacked autoencoder. Two classification approaches are 
implemented to distinguish between the authentic and 
counterfeit ICs. One approach is based on a support vector 
machine (SVM) with a radial basis function kernel, and the other 
approach is based on a deep neural network.  Our method has 
advantages over physical testing because it is non-destructive 
and completely automated, thus it is independent of subject 
matter experts. In comparison to electrical testing, our technique 
does not rely on parameters that have the potential to show great 
variance and does not require additional information about the 
chip, such as a circuit netlist or circuit scan chain. Finally, our 
entire process, from the image capture step to the classification of 
the IC sample runs in 2 seconds, making it a viable option for 
military or industrial implementation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 
2, we elaborate on the steps involved in our approach including 
the X-ray microscopy setup and the feature extraction and pre-
classification algorithms. Section 3 discusses our two image 
classification approaches and the details related to their training. 
In section 4, we discuss our experimental results. Conclusions 
and related future work are given in section 5. 
 
2. Counterfeit IC Detection  
 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the counterfeit IC detection method 
we implement. In our approach an X-ray image of the die of each 
circuit is taken using an X-ray microscope. Once the X-ray image 
of the die is captured, one image from the captured set is selected 
as the base image and the other images are registered with 
respect to this base image. Once all the images have been 
registered, each registered image is divided into blocks and a 
histogram of the LBP values is generated for each block. The 
histogram of each block is then concatenated together to form a 
vector of the histograms.  
We use two types of principal component analysis 
(PCA) on the vector representations of the histograms to reduce 
the dimensionality of the feature space. In our SVM based 
approach we use linear PCA to reduce the vector size. In our deep 
neural network approach a stacked autoencoder is encapsulated 
within the first two hidden layers of the network to perform non-
linear PCA. Using the features as inputs, each classifier is then 
trained to distinguish between counterfeit and authentic ICs. In 
the following sub sections we will go over the X-ray capture 
process and the details pertaining to the pre-classification 
algorithms. 
A. X-ray Microscopy System  
X-ray microscopy has been used for a wide variety of applications 
including defect inspection [14], biomedical imaging [15] and 
image security [16], to name a few. In [15] noise analysis of X-ray 
tomography is done for improved detection of nanoparticles in 
the brain, and in [16] an X-ray backscatter imager is used for 
explosive device detection. Non-destructive defect detection using 
X-rays has also been investigated in previous literature such as 
[14,17]. In X-ray lamininography the sample and detector are 
synchronized to rotate while 180° out of phase with one another 
during imaging, and has been used to detect defects in printed 
circuit boards [14]. In X-ray grating interferometry a phase 
grating, in addition to an absorption grating is used to provide an 
absorption image, differential phase image, and visibility 
contrast image of the sample. This technique has been used to 
find micro-voids and scars in the encapsulant of ICs [17]. While 
the X-ray techniques mentioned above have potential, they have 
not been automated and have not been used for real time IC 
imaging like our proposed approach.   
A Zeiss X-radia X-ray microscope was used for the X-
ray imaging in our experiments, as shown in Figure 2. The 
voltage and power used for each X-ray image was chosen to be 90 
KV and 8W, respectively. These parameters were chosen to allow 
sufficient transmission values (22-35%).The exposure time for 
each image was selected to be 1 second. This exposure time, in 
conjunction with the voltage and power values resulted in a 
sufficient number of X-ray counts (>5000) and provided a good 
signal to noise ratio. The source and detector were positioned 
sufficiently far away (source distance 100mm and detector 
75mm) from the samples. All imaging parameters were selected 
to be in accordance with the parts manufacturer’s data sheet to 
ensure that the parts were not overexposed to X-rays so the 
dosage would remain within allowable limits.  The large field of 
view detector was chosen to be able to capture the entire die in a 
single image. In order to simulate real situations and further 
assess the robustness of our method, samples were mounted with 
different orientations and/or were tilted by the sample holder. 
 
Fig. 1. System diagram of the counterfeit IC detection method.
B. Image Registration and Feature Extraction   
We explored a number of mathematical approaches for 
registration and feature extraction of the IC images obtained by 
microscopy. Mutual information based registration [18] was 
initially considered to register the IC X-ray microscope images. 
Mutual information is a measure of the dependence among 
variables. When two gray scale images are correctly aligned, the 
dependence between their grey scale values is maximized, and 
consequently the mutual information value between the two 
images is also maximized. While this registration algorithm was 
successful in registering X-ray microscope images captured under 
the same operating parameters, this method did not perform in a 
satisfactory manner when attempting to register images to a 
base image taken under different X-ray operating parameters. In 
addition this registration algorithm was slow to converge for 
larger images. 
The registration algorithm used in our approach is 
based on the affine transform without shear. The parameters of 
the affine transform are computed by  minimizing the difference 
between a series of correspondence points obtained using filters. 
For our registration, we use the four corners of the dies of the 
chips as correspondence points between the two images. To avoid 
having to manually set the points, we use the cropped corners of 
the base image, and a normalized cross correlation filter [19] to 
determine the x and y pixel locations of the corners on each 
image being registered. Once we determine the x and y location 
of the four correspondence points on the image to be registered, 
we use linear least squares minimization [20] to determine the 
affine transform parameters, and apply the computed transform 
parameters to the image to be registered.  
After registering the X-ray images we compute the local 
binary pattern (LBP) of every pixel in each image. LBPs are a 
non-parametric feature extractor originally used for face 
recognition [21]. LBP creates an 8 bit binary number for each 
pixel in an image that represents the pixel’s relationship to the 
intensity of its closest neighbors. In our implementation of the 
LBP conversion method each pixel’s grayscale intensity is 
compared to the grayscale intensity of its 8 closest neighbors, as 
shown in Figure 3. After each pixel’s binary neighbor 
representation is generated the pattern type of the binary 
number is determined.  
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of local binary pattern pixel calculation. 
There are two significant binary pattern types, uniform 
and non-uniform patterns. A binary number with a uniform 
pattern has two or less bit changes and a binary number that has 
more than two bit changes is considered non-uniform. It has been 
shown in [21] that for the majority of images, 90% of LBP 8 bit 
binary values are uniform patterns. For our set of IC images, on 
average 85.49% of the pixels in each image could be directly 
represented by uniform patterns. The range of an 8 bit number is 
0 to 255, and there are a total number of 58 uniform patterns in 
this range. As a result the LBP of each pixel can be represented 
by 1 of 58 values instead of the 256 different values that can be 
represented by an 8 bit number.  
As stated in [21], despite the majority of patterns being 
uniform, non-uniform LBPs still exist in images. Any binary 
number with more than 2 bit changes is converted into a uniform 
pattern. In our appraoch, the non-uniform LBP is converted to a 
uniform LBP by measuring the Hamming distance between the 
current non-uniform 8 bit binary number and all 58 uniform 
patterns. The uniform pattern that has the shortest Hamming 
distance to the non-uniform pattern is used, and the non-uniform 
pattern is thereby replaced with the closest uniform 
approximation. If two or more patterns are tied for closest 
Hamming distance then the decimal Euclidian distance is 
computed for each of the closest uniform candidates and the 
candidate with the shortest Euclidean distance is selected. 
 
 
 
3. Counterfeit IC Classification  
 
We use two different strategies to classify our data. Our first 
approach is based on a support vector machine (SVM) with a 
radial basis function kernel [22,23]. The other classification 
approach is based on a deep neural network [24]. SVM works by 
creating a hyperplane in a high dimensional space that can act as 
a discriminator between two classes [25]. SVM achieves this 
separation by minimizing the following function: 
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given the following constraints: 
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where in Eq. (1), ܰ is the total number of training samples, ݓ 
represents a weight vector, C is the reciprocal of the 
regularization parameter used to avoid over fitting when the 
Fig. 2. X-ray microscope interior view. 
classification problem contains non-separable or noisy data 
points, and Ɍ௜ is a slack variable for the ݅௧௛  training sample. In 
Eq. (2), ݕ௜ represents the class label (1 or -1), ܾ represents a bias 
term, ݔ௜ represents the data vector corresponding to the ݅௧௛ 
training sample and ߶ሺǤ ሻ is a kernel function that maps the 
input vector to a higher dimensional space. We used the radial 
basis function kernel: 
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where ǔ is the width parameter and ݔ௜ is the ݅௧௛ training sample.  
The SVM is set up with two classification parameters, as shown 
in Eqs. (1) and (4). The particular values of the SVM parameters, 
C and ǔ, were obtained through an exhaustive grid search.  From 
the entire set of authentic and counterfeit ICs we randomly 
generated 4 different training and test partitions, each 
containing the same number of authentic and counterfeit 
samples. The training part of each partition was used to train the 
SVM with the specific C and ǔ values. The test part of each 
partition was used to determine the accuracy of the SVM. After 
the accuracy of SVM for each of the four test sets was computed, 
the average accuracy of the four sets was calculated and used as 
the qualifying metric to determine the best ǔ and C parameters. 
The deep neural network consists of one input layer 
followed by a stacked autoencoder and a multilayer neural 
network classifier. The overall architecture results in four hidden 
layers and one output layer, as shown in Figure 4. A stacked 
autoencoder network makes up the input layer and first two 
hidden layers of the deep neural network. The third and fourth 
hidden layers, and the output layer of the neural network act as 
a classifier. The classifier part of the network and the 
autoencoder layers are trained differently to avoid the problems 
associated with training all the layers of a deep network using 
only backpropagation [26]. The stacked autoencoder was trained 
using a greedy layer-wise approach [27] as shown in Figure 5. In 
this training method, each layer is trained separately. For each 
layer L, the input to this layer from the previous layer L-1 is set 
as the target output. Layer L is then trained using stochastic 
gradient descent backpropagation for a given number of 
iterations, or until an error threshold is reached. After the 
weights of layer L have been trained, the process is repeated for 
the next layer L+1. The pseudocode for this training algorithm is 
given in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Deep neural network used in our classification 
approach. The squares labeled ܨ represent the input to the 
network. The neurons labeled ௜ܰ
௝in red represent the ݅௧௛ neuron 
in the ݆௧௛ layer of the stacked autoencoder. The neurons labeled 
௜ܰ
௝ in blue represent the ݅௧௛ neuron in the ݆௧௛ layer in the 
classification part of the network. 
 
After the autoencoder part of the network was set up 
using greedy layer-wise training, the entire network was trained 
using stochastic gradient descent backpropagation as part of the 
fine tuning step to adjust the weights of the entire deep neural 
network. For our classification part of the network we used two 
hidden layers, which were obtained through empirical testing. It 
is possible to approximate any continuous function with a single 
hidden layer comprised of a finite number of neurons according 
to the universal approximation theorem [28]. However in our 
implementation, we chose two layers to reduce the overall 
complexity that a single hidden layer with a large number of 
neurons would create, and to improve the classification run time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Encoder-Decoder network setup. The neurons ܪଵǡǥܪ௥ 
represent the current layer ܮ being trained. ܨଵǡǥ ǡ ܨ௠ represents 
the inputs from the previous layer ܮ െ ͳ and ܨ෠ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܨ෠௠ represent 
the output neurons of the network which approximate a 
reconstruction of the input that is discarded after training. 
 
 
 
4. Experimental Results   
 
We used a set of 32 Intel Flash TB28F400 series ICs, of which 14 
were authentic and 18 were counterfeit, to test our method. We 
divided our data set into two parts, a training set and a testing 
set, each containing 7 authentic and 9 counterfeit chips. For the 
SVM we used a radial basis function kernel with ǔ=5.455 and 
C=6.9519. These values were obtained using the exhaustive 
search detailed in Section 3. After training, the SVM was able to 
correctly identify 87.5% of the chips in the test set. The confusion 
matrix for the SVM is given in Table 1.  
 
 
 Predicted Positive Predicted Negative 
Positive Class True Positive(TP)=5 False Negative(FN)=2 
Negative 
Class 
False Positive(FP)=0 True Negative(TN)=9 
Table 1. Support vector machine confusion matrix
 
The area under the curve (AUC) is defined as [29]: 
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where TP stands for true positive, TN stands for true negative, 
FN stands for false negative, and FP stands for false positive. For 
the SVM, AUC=0.857.   
Fig. 6. Pseudocode for greedy layer-wise autoencoder training 
 
  The deep neural network consisted of one input layer of 
size 3712 followed by four hidden layers of size 100, 50, 30, and 
10, with 1 neuron in the output layer. A stacked autoencoder was 
used as the first two hidden layers of the neural network and the 
third and fourth hidden layers of the network were used for 
classification. The deep neural network was able to correctly 
classify all of the chips in the test set, giving it an accuracy of 
100%. The confusion matrix for the deep neural network is given 
in Table 2. For the deep neural network, AUC=1.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Deep neural network confusion matrix 
 Predicted Positive Predicted Negative 
Positive Class True Positive(TP)=7 False Negative(FN)=0 
Negative 
Class 
False Positive(FP)=0 True Negative(TN)=9 
 
Comparing the SVM to the deep neural network, we 
can see there is a discrepancy in performance between the two 
classifiers. This difference can be attributed to two main factors, 
the distribution of the data set created by linear PCA and the 
stacked autoencoder, and the difference in classifier architecture. 
It has been shown in [30] that autoencoders are more effective in 
reducing the dimensionality of a data set than standard linear 
PCA. In our data set, this same trend is also apparent. For the 
Intel Flash TB28F400 series IC used in our data set, there are 
two different ways the ICs can be counterfeit, as shown in Figure 
7. The die replacement counterfeit ICs are distinctly different, 
while the bond wire configuration counterfeit ICs bear an 
extremely close resemblance to the authentic chips. This creates 
a problem in classification when using linear PCA because the 
bond wire counterfeit sample points are not easily 
distinguishable from the authentic sample points. This can be 
visually seen by graphing the first three principal components of 
each IC sample, as shown in Figure 8. In the blue circled region 
in Figure 8, the bond wire counterfeit and authentic sample 
points lie very close together. However, non-linear PCA (through 
an autoencoder) can generate a better separation of data points, 
as shown in Figure 9. Comparing the two principal component 
graphs, it can be seen that the circled region of difficult 
classification that is present in the linear PCA in Figure 8 does 
not occur in the non-linear PCA in Figure 9.  
A deep neural network may also outperform an SVM 
due to their difference in classifier architecture. SVMs are 
considered a type 2 shallow architecture [24], and it has been 
shown in [26, 31] that a classifier with a deep architecture, such 
as a deep neural network, can outperform a shallow architecture. 
Examining the parameters used to create the SVM, we can also 
see certain architectural problems relating to our data set. In a 
normal classification approach, it is undesirable to closely fit a 
function to the data. SVM avoids this problem by using a slack 
variable, which is controlled by the parameter C. Use of this 
parameter allows some data points to fall inside the region of 
separation or on the wrong side of the hyperplane, which in our 
particular case results in more misclassifications. Alternatively, 
neural networks have no parameter to control over-fitting. 
Because the data points in the circled region in Figure 8 are so 
close together, it is necessary to fit the function precisely to the 
data points to achieve high accuracy. 
 
 
Fig. 7. (a) Authentic integrated circuit, (b) counterfeit 
integrated circuit with incorrect bond wire configuration, and 
(c) counterfeit integrated circuit with replaced die. In the 
authentic integrated circuit and the bond wire counterfeit 
integrated circuit the bond wire configurations are enlarged 
and highlighted to denote the differences between the two. 
Our image processing integrated with our classification 
algorithms in addition to the X-ray capture process is able to run 
in real time. Running the trained deep neural network or SVM 
on a sample using a computer with an Intel i7 central processing 
unit clocked at 2.2 gigahertz resulted in an average run time of 
0.97 seconds. Combining the X-ray image capture process and 
the algorithm classification run time, our complete procedure 
runs in approximately 2 seconds for each IC sample. 
 Fig. 8. Graph of the first three principal components of the 
counterfeit (red) and authentic (green) integrated circuits using 
linear PCA. Circled in blue is the classification area requiring 
precise fitting. 
5. Conclusion   
 
We have developed an effective technique using X-ray microscopy 
and a series of image processing and classification algorithms to 
successfully distinguish between authentic and counterfeit ICs. 
In our procedure, we first register the X-ray images using the 
affine transform, whose parameters are computed using linear 
least squares minimization, and then use LBPs to extract 
features. Dimensionality reduction is carried out using linear 
PCA, as well as non-linear PCA through a stacked autoencoder. 
We apply two separate classification approaches, one based on an 
SVM with a Gaussian kernel, and another using a deep neural 
network. Testing on a mix of several authentic and counterfeit 
chips results in a counterfeit detection rate of 87.5% using the 
SVM classifier, while the deep neural network using a stacked 
autoencoder achieves a 100% accurate detection rate. The better 
performance of a deep neural network (using a stacked 
autoencoder), over an SVM (with dimensionality reduction using 
PCA) has been observed in recent difficult classification problems 
[24] and has even been shown to come close to matching human 
visual perception [32]. In summary, our complete counterfeit 
detection procedure is highly accurate for the samples we have 
used in the experiments, runs in real time, is non-destructive, is 
independent of subject matter experts, and requires no additional 
information about the IC chip being tested. While we have 
primarily examined deep neural networks and SVM, a variety of 
other classification approaches could be considered in future 
work [33-39]. In addition, a variety of applicable microscopy 
approaches may be considered in the future [40]. 
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